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ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF JAPANESE
FISBfERIES REGULATION AND CONTROL
SALVATORE COMITIN
INTRODUCTION
Japan is unique among the so-called free-market economies in that
over 85 percent of all fishing operations is regulated and controlled by
law.' This distinguishing characteristic of Japanese fishing operations
has led some observers to infer that it may be the most signficant
factor in the seemingly "comparative advantage" which Japan enjoys
over Western nations in high seas fishing. However, the regulations,
as they have developed, are not as rigidly imposed and inflexible as
those under a centrally planned economy such as that of the Soviet
Union. Nor are the regulations quite as limited-in the economic sense
of that term-as in Western nations such as Canada and the United
States which impose practically no limits on entry of economic re-
sources into the fisheries. Rather, the regulations are more a blend
of these extremes. That is, although subject to close state supervision
and controls, private enterprise is the prevailing form of economic
organization throughout all sectors of the Japanese fishing industry
and, through trade association and union pressure, can influence the
nature of the control mechanism and fishery policy in general.'
From factual reports and general knowledge it is clear that both
Japan and the Soviet Union are rapidly building up extensive and
modern deep-sea fleets capable of fishing all over the world and even
on grounds close to foreign nations. The United States and Canada,
on the other hand, are still focusing the major part of their effort
on the coastal fisheries.3 What are the factors responsible for this
* Visiting Associate Professor, Department of Economics, The Ohio State
University. This article was completed while the author held a research fellowship at
the Mershon Center for Education in National Security at The Ohio State University.
I FISHERIES AGENCY, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, GYOGY6NI KAN-
SURU KIHONTEKI SEIDO NO GENKYO (Present condition of the basic regime of fish-
eries) 2 (1958).
For a comprehensive treatment of the development of Japanese fisheries regula-
tions see Comitini, A Sectoral Study of the Economic Development of Japanese
Fisheries Exploitation (1960) (doctoral dissertation in University of Washington
library).3 F. CHRIsTY & A. ScoTr, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES: SOME
PROBLEMS OF GROWTH AND EcoNoMIc ALLOCATION (1965); BUREAU OF COMMERCIAL
FISHERIES, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, 1963 REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF COMMERCIAL
FISHERIES (1965).
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trend of events? In the case of the Soviet Union the motivation
seems to stem primarily from recent calculations which tend to show
that animal protein procured from the marine fisheries can be provided
more cheaply to the economy than an equivalent amount can be
obtained from livestock husbandry.4 In the case of Japan, given her
high population/land ratio, it is obviously cheaper to exploit the rich
marine resources to secure animal protein for her masses than to
attempt to produce meat products on her relatively scarce land re-
sources. Fish consumption in Japan accounts for almost three-fourths
of the total intake of animal products, practically all supplied from
domestic landings, and per capita consumption has increased more
than 30 percent since prewar years. This is quite unique among the
nations of the world-and reflects both taste preferences among the
Japanese for fish and the conscious strategy of the central authorities
to regularly reallocate economic resources from crowded coastal waters
to the offshore and the high seas in preference to importing animal
protein products.
The pattern of the Japanese demand for fish is also unique in its high
diversification in contrast to the more specialized demand of North
American and West European nations. For example, the most impor-
tant single species-the jack mackerel-accounts for only 8 percent of
Japanese landings whereas over a third of the catches of Norway, the
United Kingdom, and the United States are dominated by a single
species.' The significance of this is that Japanese fisheries management
has tended to focus more on optimizing the aggregate fisheries haul and
stabilizing economic conditions within each operational sector of the
industry than on optimizing the sustainable yield of particular stocks of
fish, which is the apparent objective of the management policies of
Western nations.
Of the distant-waters fish catch, Japanese fishermen take over half
from the North Pacific Ocean and slightly more than 20 percent from
the South Pacific Ocean. Almost three-fourths of the high seas catch,
therefore, is taken from the fishery resources of the Pacific Ocean.6
The stability of these operations is being threatened from essentially
two different directions. On one flank is the relatively recent intrusion
of fishing vessels of the Soviet Union, South Korea, and Taiwan into
Mikhailov, On the Comparative Efficiency of Production of Some Products of
the Land and Sea, 2(3) OKEANOLOGIIA 385 (1962).
CHRISTY & SCOTT, supra note 3, at 109.
o MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, 1964 FISHERIES STATISTICS OF JAPAN
(1966).
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waters traditionally developed and exploited by Japanese fishermen,
e.g., high seas salmon, tuna, and the trawl fisheries. On the other
flank, meanwhile, Japanese high seas fishing is caught in the crossfire
of increasing numbers of coastal nations who are unilaterally extending
fishing limits; presently, those adhering to the old 3-mile territorial
limit-e.g. Japan-are clearly in the minority. As a result of these
events, traditional Japanese thinking on the freedom of the seas is
undergoing serious reconsideration. This is apparent from official
interest being shown toward catch quota regulations on the high seas
and international agreements recognizing wider territorial rights of
coastal nations. In view of these postwar occurrences there is some
concern in Japan that traditional regulation of the fisheries will prove
inadequate to meet the changed conditions. The purpose of this paper
is: (1) to study the legal foundations and policies of the present
system and demonstrate how it has molded the fishery and how it has,
in turn, been molded by the fishery; and (2) to question whether the
present system can continue to allocate resources effectively in the
light of the aforementioned events and suggest possible alternatives
which might better allocate the economic resources of Japan.
I. Tm FI HErlS CONTROL SYSTEM
It is generally felt by those who have studied Japanese fisheries
management that the decision of the new Meiji regime in 1868 to
retain the feudal fishery right system strongly influenced the course
of development of the Japanese fishing industry from that time
onward.7 Historically speaking, the Japanese fisheries have been the
most extensively regulated, by both custom and law, in the world.
The basic legal regulation is composed of two primary parts: the
fishery right system and the licensing system-the former applying
to coastal fishing and the latter to deep-sea fishing. This scheme of
fisheries management is a curious combination of both common and
private fishing rights.
A. The Fishery Right System
The fishery right system, descending from feudal days, assigned
operational control of the coastal fisheries to village bosses (oyakata)
who as the boat and net owners (funamoto and amimoto) constituted
'See Kasahara, Japawese Fisheries and Fishery Regulations, in CALIFORNIA AND
THE WORLDn OCEAN 58 (1964); KONDo, GYOGY6 KEIZAI GAIRON (A survey of the
economics of the fishing industry) 1-5 (1959) ; Comitini, supra note 2, at 124-34.
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the employing class within the fishing villages. The Meiji Government,
in a move designed to enlist support for the new regime, extended legal
status to the traditional community fishery right system by enacting the
Fishery Union Regulation of 1886. Under this act, the adjacent coastal
waters were regarded as the "real property" of the village fishing asso-
ciations, and all households were required to join the cooperative in
order to have fishing privileges. Actually, such cooperative societies,
dominated by the oyakata, existed in virtually all fishing communities
purely as a matter of economic organization. The practical effect, then,
was to legalize the de facto feudalistic institutions which customarily
prevailed in the fishing communities.
The Fishery Law of 1901 was enacted for the chief purpose of
systematizing the legal meaning of fishing rights throughout Japan;
it thus forms the legal basis of the modern fishery right system. The
law, in effect, clearly distinguished between "common" rights and
"private" rights in the coastal waters. The former were the exclusive
rights granted to the fishery cooperative allowing member households
to fish in community "right" waters on an equal basis. The latter
applied to specific undertakings within the coastal waters-namely,
the fixed-net, drag-net, beach-seine, and aquicultural operations-lim-
iting utilization of a specific area, or a specific season of the year,
to private operators engaged in these enterprises.
Even though the fishermen's association was the legal owner of the
fishing right, it could not itself (i.e., qua association) engage in
fishing operations. Its importance lay primarily in its control over
the fishermen. Thus, even though the fishermen fished independently,
they were subject to regulations laid down by the association. The
section of the law prohibiting the association from directly operating
the fishing rights ensured that the large-scale fixed-net rights remained
in the hands of the "customary" users. These private-right fisheries,
preempting the best fishing grounds, were several times more pro-
ductive than the common-right fisheries.'
As a result of the chaotic situation in the coastal and offshore
fisheries in the post-World War II period, the central government,
with the assistance of the SCAP Authority, sought to reform the
traditional institutions in an attempt to increase output in these areas.
SCiVir. INFORMATION AND EDUCATION SECTION, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SUPREME
COM MANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS (hereinafter cited as SCAP), SOME ASPECTS
OF THE FISHERY RIGHT SYSTEM IN SELECTED JAPANESE FISHING COMM UNITIES 16-17
(1948).
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A new fishing code was consequently enacted in 1949.1 The new
Fisheries Law reorganized the whole regulation system except that
no significant reforms were made in the prefectural permission system.
The government provided financial assistance to fishermen's associa-
tions for vessel building and repair, ports, and market improvements.
Under the old law, licenses were given to those who previously held
fishing rights thus extending legal protection and maintaining the
status quo of feudal Japan. Under the new law, fishing rights were
to be issued by prefectural governors, with the assistance of district
arbitration committees, according to eligibility and in conformity with
the aggregate fishery development plan. One of the most significant
changes in the law was prohibiting the transfer or leasing of fishing
rights. Previously, associations frequently leased their fishing rights to
the person paying the highest rent. This was thought to have led to
excessive concentration of control over fishing rights. Thus the new
fishing code reflected an attempt to "democratize" the institutional
structure of Japanese coastal fishing.
In systematizing the fishery right system, the law subclassifies
fishing rights into three types:
1. Common right. This right corresponds to the former "exclusive
right" and is granted on a first-priority basis to fishermen's associa-
tions and then to municipalities. Unless specified, no exclusive right
on an individual basis can be claimed. Although not too substantial
in relation to total catch, almost all near-shore fishing operations are
dependent upon these rights and are therefore of major concern to
small-scale fishermen.
2. Fixed-net right. This right grants an exclusive right to an indi-
vidual or cooperative for fixed-net fishing within the common right
area. Since these operations must correspond to the specific definition
under the law, they must be licensed by the prefectural governor.
The reason for this stricter regulation than for common rights is that,
under the new code, fixed-net rights are required to be balanced
against other fishing operations in the aggregate fishery development
plan. The law provides for district arbitration committees, whose
members are elected by the fishermen of the respective districts, to
advise the prefectural governors on planning of fishing areas, issuance
of licenses, and implementation of administrative codes. In most cases,
however, the granting of fixed-net rights has been on a seniority basis
I FISHERIES AGENCY, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, THE FISHERIES
LAW (1949).
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so that the traditional holders of these rights have been able to retain
exclusive control.
3. Demarcated right. Under the new law this right retains its cus-
tomary meaning as a right to engage in shallow sea culture. Since this
also requires an exclusive right to operate in a common right area it is
as rigidly controlled as are fixed-net rights.
B. The Licensing System
All types of fishing are regulated by the Fisheries Law and the
Marine Resources Conservation Law.1° Under these two laws, regu-
lations may be issued for purposes of conservation and controlling
wasteful competition or as a means of aggregate planning. The new
law is much more positive in its provisions for controlling the fishery
resources than the old law which was mainly negative in its approach.
An important reason for this change stems from the international
restrictions and regulations imposed upon Japanese fishery expansion
following World War II.
The administrative method of balancing the existing aquatic re-
sources with the existing catch capacity utilizes the licensing sys-
tem. Licenses, or permits, for operating in certain types of fisheries
are granted by either the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry or
by the prefectural governors depending upon the nature of the fishery.
Under the Fisheries Law, the designated high seas fisheries require
permission from the Ministry while the small and medium dragnetters,
operating in coastal and offshore waters, are required to obtain pre-
fectural permission. Legally, the prefectures are precluded from hav-
ing any jurisdiction over the fisheries. Generally, however, the Fish-
eries Agency, which is responsible for implementing the law, delegates
the responsibility for matters of local interest to the prefectural
governors according to tradition and convenience. The governor then,
acting as a national officer, can issue regulations having the effect
of national regulations." Administrative codes relating to areas, sea-
sons, gear, etc., can be promulgated by the respective authorities to
prevent conflicts among fishermen and to maintain maximum utiliza-
tion of the resources. Under the Marine Resources Conservation Law,
o FISHERIES AGENCY, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, GYOGY6 NI KAN-
SURU KIHINTEKI SEIDO NO GENKY6 (Present condition of the basic regime of fish-
eries) 30-53 (1958).
'- Cf. R. CROKER, JAPANESE FISHERIES ADMINISTRATION 5 (SCAP, Natural Re-
sources Section, Mar., 1951) ; ECONOMIiCS BRANCH, FISHERIES DIVISION, UNITED
NATIONS FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, ORGANIZATION OF FISHERIES AD-
MINISTRATION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 49 (1964).
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the authorities can issue regulations almost at will in order to protect
the resources. Usually, however, the authorities consider the fisher-
men's position in such matters.
It is important to recognize that implementation and enforcement
of the regulations have as their main objective the reconciliation of
offshore and inshore fishing interests. The evolution of restrictions
was such that a strip along the outer fringe of the fishery right area
was closed to medium trawlers in order to safeguard the small trawler
operations, then certain offshore grounds were open only to medium
trawlers and off-limits to large trawlers, so that the larger boats were
steadily pushed out to the more distant grounds. This form of "fishery
husbandry" focused not on economic efficiency nor on rational man-
agement of fishery resources but rather on securing the survival of
the smaller-scale, labor-intensive coastal and offshore operations."2
Between the prewar and postwar periods the percentage of the total
catch from fishery right fishing substantially declined while that from
license fishing surged far ahead. It is estimated that the prewar
output from fishery right fishing was 65 percent of the total catch
and that from license fishing about 30 percent.3 Currently these
proportions are approximately reversed, reflecting the steadily increas-
ing importance of the offshore and high seas fisheries. In view of
this occurrence, many observers have questioned whether the Fisheries
Law, which stresses fishery right rather than license fishing, is appro-
priate to cope with these latest developments.
A recent official report 4 noted that if Japanese fisheries exploitation
is divided up between less than and more than 10 miles from shore,
within the 10-mile zone (and especially within 3 miles of the coast)
the prefectural governors' authority overwhelmingly predominates.
As the distance away from the coast increases, the Ministry's authority
increases proportionately. Within each division, however, the different
authorities (thus regulations) tend to overlap causing serious conflicts
within the regulatory system. Since the prefectural authorities are
largely involved in all three divisions, their partiality to local interests
often clashes with the general aims of the national administration.
This suggests a lack of coordination within the Japanese fisheries
"'See Comitini, Marine Resources Exploration and Management in the Economic
Development of Japan, in Ecoxomic DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE (1966).
21 FISHERIES AGENCY, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, GYOGY6 NI KAN-
SURU KIHONTEKI SEIDO NO GENKYO (Present condition of the basic regime of fish-
eries) 3 (1958).
11 Id. at 9.
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control system in the sense that the Ministry has no direct influence
on nearshore operations. This conflict was clearly exemplified in the
prewar period when as the Ministry restricted both the number and
area of operations of the otter trawlers in the East China Sea fishery,
the prefectural authorities allowed the bull and medium trawlers to
quickly take up the slack thus leading to the overcapacity which the
Ministry was attempting to prevent.' 5
The licensing system was applied to different fisheries at different
time intervals. In many cases a license limiting entry into a fishery
was required only after overexploitation and excessive competition
became apparent. The simplest solution was to divert part of the
fleet to other fisheries or regions which were relatively underdeveloped,
e.g., the North Pacific Ocean. When it is considered necessary to
curtail excessive inputs, usually the first step is to place restrictions
on fishing grounds according to size of boats. For example, trawlers
larger than 50 tons must operate west of longitude 1300 E. in the East
China Sea while trawlers less than 50 tons must operate east of this
line.'6 The next step is to allocate inputs by types of boats and
tonnage of individual vessels. For example, licensed trawlers in adja-
cent waters are subject to stringent restrictions on fishing equipment,
method of fishing, and horsepower of engines. Also, tonnage restric-
tions curb their efficiency and radius of operations. In contrast, no
(or only relatively mild) restrictions are placed on these characteristics
for trawlers operating in offshore and high seas waters while a higher
minimum boat size is stipulated. 7
In awarding licenses, the law gives priority to applicants who have
fishing experience and sufficient capital to engage in fishing operations.
In order to stabilize fishing effort on the traditional grounds, licenses
for new vessels require scrapping or converting an equivalent tonnage.
This requirement may be waived in cases where a vessel agrees to
operate either wholly or partly in newly opened distant grounds. For
example, new licenses are granted only for trawler operations in the
Bering Sea and other deep-sea areas on the condition that otter
trawling in the East China Sea be given up.'
Although the law forbids transfer of a license, technically it can
"See Oka, Watanabe & I-asagawa, The Economic Effects of the Regulations of the
Trawl Fisheries of Japan, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FISHERY REGULATION 203 (Ham-
lisch ed. 1962) (hereinafter cited as Oka).
'OId. at 192.
17 Id. at 194.IsId. at 188.
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be transferred when a vessel is sold by cancelling the seller's license
and simultaneously issuing a new one to the buyer. There is an
element of economic rent in the sale since the price paid reflects the
profitability of the operation. The price of a license would therefore
differ for different fisheries, being higher, for example, for the salmon
fisheries where entry is closely controlled. The government, however,
does not consider this rent element in determining the number of
licenses to issue. Generally, when a particular fishery is profitable,
the Fisheries Agency is subjected to strong political pressure to issue
more licenses. 19
II. EVALUATION OF ECONOmIc EFFECTS OF THE CONTROL SYSTEM
The Meiji regime left the feudalistic fishery institutions pretty
much intact in order to avoid friction and social unrest. Therefore,
productivity and efficiency in the coastal fisheries were sacrificed for
allegiance to the new regime. This policy affected the government's
attitude toward new techniques and large-scale operations. In essence,
these were controlled to prevent conflicts with the nearshore fisheries.
Eventually, practically all offshore and high seas fisheries were brought
under the "licensing system" which limited entry by requiring vessels
to have licenses. The size of vessel, area, method, species, and period
of fishing are all regulated primarily to control the amount of fishing
effort so as to protect the economic welfare of the different classes
in the industry.20 If, as a result of limited entry, rent is created in
a fishery so that profits are better than in other fisheries, then the
government is faced with political pressure to issue more licenses.
Under this type of system the only way to attain a maximum sustained
yield is to cut back on efficiency (i.e., raise costs) which is accom-
plished by pushing the more efficient vessels outward and restricting
the size of offshore vessels.2'
" Keen, Some Aspects of the Economic Geography of the Japanese Sklipjack-Tuna
Fishery 38-9 (1965) (doctoral dissertation in University of Washington library).
'The following statement is made in Oka, supra note 15, at 180: "The principal
object of control must be an easing of competition between different regions and
class interests in the industry." The authors also state, id. at 190: "Regulation has
been enforced not for the direct object of maintaining an equilibrium between fishing
effort and resource yield. Rather, restrictions have been imposed, wherever necessity
arose, as a countermeasure against a recession in the fishery business caused by
fluctuations in the Japanese economy."
= This is implied from the following statement in Oka, id. at 196:
It follows, therefore, that fishing grounds meeting the above mentioned conditions
(i.e., high productivity fishing grounds along the coast) should be left entirely to low
efficiency boats, while high efficiency boats should be used to open up low productivity
offshore fishing grounds which cannot be developed satisfactorily by low efficiency
boats. This may be regarded as the implicit objectivity of fishery control in Japan.
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Due to the unique development of the regulatory system, control
through licensing has become "institutionalized" in the system so that
other methods of regulation which might have merit from a biological
standpoint-e.g., a quota system and mesh-size regulations-have
been largely ignored. Whatever conservation aspects there are to the
system are primarily oriented to coastal and offshore fisheries where
the effects of fishing are more readily apparent. On the high seas,
however, the effects are much less apparent and in the postwar period
restraints on fishing intensity have come primarily from international
pressure through conventions 22 and in some cases unilateral restrictions
imposed by other countries.
The requirement to retire an equivalent tonnage when adding to
vessel capacity has resulted in a sharp increase in the number of large
vessels and a concomitant decrease in the number of smaller vessels.
This is clearly implied by the relative changes in the number of
powered boats between 1953-1963 shown in appendix B. Also clearly
reflected from the data in appendix A is a significant reallocation of
effort from the nearshore grounds to more distant fishing areas. Since
there is no maximum tonnage limit for vessels fishing on the high
seas, the possibility of transferring licenses has stimulated a sharp
increase in the number of vessels 200 tons and over. The policy of
the government to lessen the pressure on domestic grounds by encour-
aging the larger craft to shift to more distant waters led to increased
exploitation of the South China Sea in the early post-occupation years
and thence to the North Pacific grounds and the high seas in recent
years (see appendix E). This policy is officially credited with increas-
ing the catch of the whole Japanese fishing fleet.13 Costs and earnings
figures for 1964 are available for the fishery enterprises operating
within each tonnage stratum24 and the gross rate of return from fishing
operations has been calculated (i.e., fisheries net income as a percent-
- To United States fishery experts assigned to the SCAP Authority during the
Occupation, the Japanese fisheries research and control program was most vulnerable
in the emphasis which was placed on increased production and protection of income
classes rather than on conservation and "rational" fisheries management. Also
severely criticized was the extent to which this policy carried over into high seas
fisheries, thus creating international friction and antagonism. It was strongly recom-
mended, therefore, that in the post-treaty period Japan participate in international
fishery agreements which have as their basic objective the "proper" management of
the high seas fisheries. SCAP, Fisheries Programs in Japan, Rep. No. 152, 28-45
(1951) ; Croker, supra note 11, at 9; W. HERRINGTON, A PROGRAM FOR JAPANESE
COASTAL FISHERIES 8 (1951).
'See the statement by Kamenaga of the Japanese Fisheries Agency in Oka, supra
note 15, at 217-18.
_ This is based on a sample operating within each category.
[ VOL. 43 :179
JAPANESE FISHERIES REGULATION
age of invested capital, as shown in appendix B. The gross rate of
return appears to have a downward tendency as one moves from the
lower toward the higher tonnage classes. When a cost of capital of
approximately 9.5 percent is imputed2 the smaller operations exhibit
a tendency to be more profitable than the larger. In fact, the largest
tonnage class-that between 200-500 tons-shows a negative net rate
of return of almost 3 percent, strongly suggesting overcapitalization
of this particular tonnage category. This class displays the most
rapid rate of increase in number of operating units. Most of the
boats between 200-500 tons operate in the skipjack-tuna long line
fishery. One can clearly see the effects of the control system by the
relative rates of change in the number of management units of some
of the major fisheries shown in appendix C. Between 1954-1961, the
number of management units in the large trawl fishery west of longi-
tude 130' E. declined by 25 percent. Other substantial declines oc-
curred in the medium trawl fisheries east of longitude 1300 E. and
the skipjack pole and line fishery. Conversely, by 1961 the number
of management units operating in the long line fishery increased by
more than 50 percent. The saury stick-held dip net fishery, which is
one of the few free fisheries in Japan, during this period displayed
a rather unstable tendency toward increase in the number of operating
units. These tendencies may be compared with available data on
costs and earnings of these enterprises in 1964. Computation of
the net rate of return, which is the profit rate (before taxes), is shown
in appendix D. There tends to be an inverse correspondence between
the trend in the number of management units in the various fisheries
(appendix C) and the average rate of return (appendix D). That is,
the most profitable are the trawl fisheries and skipjack pole and line
fishery which experienced significant declines in the number of oper-
ating units in recent years. On the other hand, the tuna long line
and saury fisheries had negative returns in 1964. These are the
fisheries which had rapid increases in the number of management
units over this period. While these comparisons are admittedly rough,
' This is the average interest charge for borrowed and invested capital for those
boats operating in the major fisheries shown in appendix D.
'In 1960 shipjack-tuna vessels accounted for 70% of the fishing boats between
200-500 tons. By contrast, only 20% of the boats 500 tons and over were skipjack-tuna
vessels. MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 73 (1961).
"' This fishery absorbs a large number of vessels during the offseason or period of
restricted fishing of other fisheries.
MINISTRY OF AGRIcULTURE AND FOaSTY, 1964 FISHERIEs STATISTICS OF JAPAN
34-5 (1966).
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they do tend to reflect in a very general way the basic objectives of
the control system. That is, the policy of switching craft from rela-
tively congested fisheries to other operations, e.g., saury dip net and
tuna long line, has tended to raise the rate of return of the former and to
depress the rate of return of the latter.2"
The fact that the government in issuing licenses is susceptible to
pressure generally means that whenever there are good profits to be
made in a fishery, there is a tendency to issue more licenses so that
capacity tends to be built up rapidly. Good profits can occur either
through a general increase in the demand for fish as the economy
grows or through technological improvements which reduce costs of
fishing. Both of these developments have occurred since the com-
mencement of industrialization in Japan. The basic policy objectives
of maximizing fisheries production, maximizing capital investment in
the fisheries, and maximizing the aggregate income of fishermen inevi-
tably has led to conflicts with other objectives which could have been
sought, e.g., efficiency of operations, allocation of economic resources
which recognizes the gain in economic welfare from equating rates of
return in all fisheries, and marine resources management which pro-
motes conservation. Given the objectives sought, the control system
lacks a general decisional standard regarding the proper number of
licenses to issue to check excessive entry. In the past, Japan considered
the high seas a "safety valve" which was eternally capable of absorbing
the excess capacity created by a combination of economic growth,
technological advancement, and the basic objectives of the control
system. However, the postwar existence of international fisheries con-
ventions to which Japan subscribes and other international pressures
which limit Japanese encroachment on formerly accessible grounds,
have set visible limits to the high seas horizon. In this new setting
Japan may find it desirable to attempt a reform of the fisheries control
structure so as to lend more of a flavor for basic economic consider-
ations, e.g., allocating economic resources to minimize cost and maxi-
mize net economic yield.
The present period appears to be a transitional one for Japan. As
the domestic catch levels off she will find it necessary to import
'The comparatively profitable operations shown here for the trawl fisheries closely
correspond to the rate of profit for those operations in 1958 as reported in Oka, slepra
note 15, at 208. From 1953 to 1956 the 2295 medium-sized trawlers aggregating 75,000
tons were reduced by 910 or by 25,300 tons through subsidies but mainly by switching
to other operations, e.g., salmon drift net, saury dip net, and tuna long line. Id. at 188.
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increasing quantities of fish to keep up with the growing demand.
Since exports will, inevitably, also level off, this will cause a strain
on the balance of payments as the previous gap between export ability
and import requirements continues to narrow. It is even conceivable-
and if present trends continue, likely-that Japan may become a net
importer of fish. What alternative approaches can Japan take in
seeking a stable solution to this problem? She can negotiate and
conciliate with the nations who have expanded their territorial waters
in an attempt to retain access to former fishing grounds. These agree-
ments, for the most part, tend to be of a short-term nature and are
therefore, merely temporary expedients which provide no guarantee
toward a long-lasting solution. She can, on the other hand, by sub-
sidizing research vessels and conducting experimental fishing oper-
ations in unexplored waters, vigorously search out and exploit new
fishing grounds. Whether conducted on a private or a governmental
basis, however, these operations are costily and, given the uncertainties
involved, there is no guarantee of long-term success, especially when
one considers the common property aspect of marine resources. An-
other possibility is for Japan to enter into joint business ventures with
countries offering new competition or expanding territorial waters, e.g.,
South Korea, the CEP (Chile, Ecuador, Peru) countries, Argentina,
the United States and Canada. However, the joint ventures engaged
in thus far have not generally proved profitable and, in any case, may
not be equally attractive to these other countries. In fact, the heaviest
sellers in the Japanese market are just those countries offering new
competition, e.g., the Soviet Union, South Korea, and Taiwan, and
countries claiming expanded territorial limits, e.g., Australia, Peru,
Mexico, and Spain. This raises the possibility of still another alterna-
tive, which is for Japan to export capital and technology to these
countries. The advantage to Japan is that by thus financing the fishing
operations of countries who now have the "comparative advantage"
she can thereby earn the necessary foreign exchange to meet her
growing import requirements. From a long-run point of view, this
may turn out to be the most realistic policy and one which would be
the most consistent with a major reform of the fisheries control
structure.
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APPENDIX D
Average Net Rate of Return of Major Japanese Fisheries*
(1964)
Tonnage & Type of Average Net
Operation Rate of Return
10-30
One boat medium trawl
East of 1300 E. 5.4
30-50
One boat medium trawl
East of 1300 E. 7.7
Tuna long line 3.4
50-100
Large trawl west
of 130' E. 8.8
One boat medium trawl
East of 1300 E. 15.3
Saury stick-held
dip net (-5.7)
Tuna long line (-8.9)
Purse-seine 3.3
100-200
Skipjack pole & line 9.5
Tuna long line (-2.8)
200-500
Tuna long line 0.6
*In 1963 these operations accounted for approximately 51 percent of the domestic
marine catch.
Note: The average net rate of return was computed by taking the difference between
net income from fishing and interest charges on invested capital as a percent
of capital invested in fishing. This measures the rate of profit (before taxes)
from fishing.
Source: MxISTRY OF AGrcuLTm An FORESTRY, 1964 FisnHmuEs STATISTICS OF
JAPAw 34-5 (1966).
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